Written by Timothy Enoni Hasmeru Halawa
Background
There is this common view today that China is an emerging power that will challenge the United States’s leadership of the liberal order. Aside from how we should define the leadership within the international system, China refuses to acknowledge its own potential to challenge the United States to be the sole leader of the international system. Instead, China wanted a multilateral system, not that kind of what the old system mentality had.
Multilateralism is said to be a system that accounts all the nation-states as equal and have the same right within the international relation. That’s why, rather than fully dumping what the United States system had brought as a heritance, that is the liberal order such as the United Nations and other multilateral mechanisms, China advocates of preserving this mechanism in the goal of making a more inclusive international system. The advocacy of using multilateral mechanisms by China was also founded in response to the 28th February War of the United States against Iran.
The 28th February War began after the negotiation of Iran’s nuclear development and facilities, where the United States demanded that Iran stop their nuclear program on the ground that it is a threat for the United States. Regardless of the actual progress of the negotiation since the mediator of it, Oman’s Foreign Minister, said that there is good progress between both parties, but Trump in the afternoon at the White House, after the negotiation, said that the negotiation does not appeal to him. Then, on the 28th February, along with Israel, they launched an attack on Tehran, targeting most of the high ranking leaders, resulting in the death of the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei.
The Iranian Revolutionary Corps Guard quickly responds to the situation with two major actions. First is by launching retaliation attacks on most of the United States’s military bases located at the Gulf states, consisting of Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, UAE, Saudi Arabia,
and Qatar, and also Israel, especially in Tel Aviv. The second action is by closing the Strait of Hormuz, a world trade route especially for oil that came from the Western Asia. This sudden closing not only disturbs the region’s security, but also the world’s security , especially on economic stability.
The spilled retaliation attack that disturbed the Gulf states’ sovereignty and the forced closure of the Hormutz Strait, became two problems that were debated by the states on how we should act regarding it. One of the multilateral mechanisms used by the states is the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), a council that served as the gate keeper for the organization collective action that was legitimized in the name of the United Nation.
China is a permanent member of the UNSC, and even has the power to veto a decision. Connecting the logic of China’s multilateral approach and the UNSC as one of the mechanisms for that approach, brought us to our inquiry: “How China makes use of the UNSC as the mechanism in the multilateral approach?” Our argument will identify two cases, that is the 7th April veto and China’s counter-narrative action since the first meeting of the UNSC. From there, we would conclude that by using the multilateral mechanism, China saves more cost rather than only depends on single actor action.
Argument
China used the multilateral approach for responding to the February War. But, what is the concept of multilateralism and why do we come out saying that the UNSC is one of its mechanisms? Now, let us first discuss the concept of multilateralism. In this explanation, we use Kasmi (2025) definition of multilateralism, that is “coordination of national policies among three or more states or international organizations to address common objectives.” This definition is a compact one and contains concepts that we should elaborate more on.
By saying that multilateralism is “coordination among states or international organizations”, we move beyond the view that multilateralism only happens inside a single organization mechanism. The coordination that happens among three or more of these actors, formally or informally, can be identified as an act of multilateralism.
The act of multilateralism is defined by an agreement by these actors to identify a common objective for them. Identifying a common objective means that they have the same problem to be solved, but the way of achieving this goal of solving the problem can be different. Here we make it clear that multilateralism does not mean that there is no contesting spirit inside the coordination. The actor can have a different view and also come in the opposite direction.
This definition of multilateralism approach also applies to China’s case, that is multilateralism is using the existing mechanism of international affairs to achieve a common objective. Inside a multilateralism, coordination not only happens inside one or two mechanisms, but can be many paths that connect to the same end, that is the common objective. In our case, in the multilateralism on solving the impact of the February War, the mechanism is also include the Pakistan mediation act (because its coordinate with the conflicting parties and also accompanied but the others), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and also the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). What should be noted here is the fact that the international organization such as the GCC or the UNSC, even when it can also be the mechanism, it also can act to coordinate with other actors.
The action of an actor inside a mechanism is defined by their power to pursue their own way of solving the problem aside from the other alternative that can be more appealing to the other actors. To observe the action of China, we can observe its power that is exercised inside the UNSC.
The operationalization to observe the concept of power is explained very fruitfully by Steven Lukes (2021) in the Three-Dimensional Power concept. This concept explains three sides that can be observed of power, the one dimension indicated by the ability of ones to win their appealed decision inside the decision-making mechanism, the second dimension indicated in the procedural mechanism that can support ones to win their interest, and the three dimensions indicated by the ability of one’s to close the gate of conflict since the beginning by controlling the other idea of their own interest.
In our case, China exercised its power that involve the one and two dimension. If the one dimension is on how it can control the decision in the decision-making, the two dimension power that China have its the ability that can be accounted inside the mechanism even as the opposition. What become our argument inside the two dimension power is by this ability to be accounted inside the mechanism, China action is also controlling the discourse as their narration strategies. Saldanha, et. al. (2022) explains the strategy in the both side of the status quo and the opposition for controlling the idea and narration. Differ from what Lukes had conceived that defines the third dimension as controlling discourse to keep conflict, the opposition narratives here happen when conflict has arisen.
In the act to emerge another narration against the other narration, Saldanha, et al. proposed three strategies: Ante-Narratives, Counter-Narratives, and the pragmatic Counter-Narratives and Situation. What we identified in our case is that China used the strategy of Counter-Narratives, that is an act if counter-formulate the other story by refusing, repudiating and contesting them. The Counter-Narratives strategy is as much for the China’s to be able identify the U.S. action as violating the UN Charter but that also the other member bias by not incorporating it rather only citing Iran’s action.
We had clarified our concepts that we will use to explain our cases, that is the decision control action in the 7th April Votes and later discourse control in the China position in the UNSC against the GCC and the european narration. Let us now explain our cases.
After the beginning of the war in the 28th February 2026, the UNSC held emergency meeting to discuss about the war. There are three motion that had been put in the table, one from France that wanting to discuss about the development of the war; second motion is from Bahrain that represent the Gulf states concern after they got retaliation attack by the Iranian; and the third motion by Russia and supported by China that concern the United States attacks against the sovereignty of the Iranian. Excluding the France motion, then we had two group positions that were opposite: a group that was citing the Iran retaliation attack and a group that was citing the United States attack.
Before the meeting, China had coordinated with Russia through their foreign minister regarding their response to the situation (FMPRC, 2026). It then came up with China and Russia having the same views on reframing the narration not only about Iran’s retaliation attack, but also the United States attacks on the 28th February. This view was then brought to the UNSC meeting and supported by China and some other states (SCR, 2026a). The emergency meeting is focused on how to frame the problem, it is the Iran or the United States action that should be considered by the states. Both of the narration that had existed laid the ground for continuing the debate on the council’s action.
The meeting chaired by the United Kingdom then agreed to discuss Bahrain’s motion, citing the Iranian retaliation attacks against the Gulf states. This will continue until the votes for draft resolution on 3rd March, where there are two draft resolutions designed by Bahrain, supported by the Gulf states and also the European states, and by Russia, supported by China. Bahrain’s draft resolution framed the situation only in the limit of Iran’s spill over attack toward the Gulf states, citing that they are the victim and not part of the conflict. On the other hand, the Russian’s draft framed the situation as the United States’ attacks on Iran. The vote goes to Bahrain’s draft and then becomes the official resolution of the UNSC by the number 2817 (SCR, 2026b).
With the Resolution 2817 on hand, the council then step up on deciding the action towards the Iranian retaliation attack. There are questions regarding the use of Article 41 and 42 of the UN Charter, that legitimize the need to use necessary means to solve the conflict, ranging from using the economic sanction to military intervention, like what happened in Iraq and Libya. But, it appears that Bahrain then doesn’t bring it in the final draft with the accusation by China that it is a deliberate action to legitimize an attack against the Iranian (SCR, 2026c).
The council then continued with scheduling a vote regarding the act of the Strait of Hormutz on 7th April. In the final draft by Bahrain, the action that is being proposed is the protection for the trading ship in the Strait of Hormutz. On the day to vote on this draft,
China and Russia used their power to veto the draft resolution, saying that it ignored the United States involvement in the war (SCR, 2026c).
From the beginning of the first meeting until April’s vote, we identified two actions by China, that is to control the council’s decision and the control of the council’s discourse or narration. Let us now explain both of these actions.
In the April’s vote, the usement of the veto power by China is explained in two ways, in the first dimension and second dimension, as what we had clarified the concept before. In the first dimension, China’s control over the council decision is overt. The situation is that Bahrain’s motion should have passed because the strong coalition compared to the Russia and China proposed narration and resolution, but in the end, even with much support by other actors, it is clear that China still has the power on hand. The first dimension of power by China is clear here without further explanation.
The second dimension of power that China exercised is their legitimate organization power. It views the veto power differently, rather than only as a power to control the decision, it also shows China’s legitimate power inside the council. What is more fascinating here is that we have two foundations regarding China’s second dimension power. The first finding is the power of veto as already mentioned. This veto power is legitimate by the organization mechanism as an actual concept inside their decision-making process, that’s why it is effective for the actors that hold it to control the decision. In the other way, if there is no support from the organization mechanism, the veto power is not used even for China.
The second founding is China’s power to make their narration also accounted for inside the council’s forum. Not many states or organization representatives can be accounted inside the council’s forum, that’s why we account China’s ability to participate as also their power. This ability is also significant because the organization mechanism requires that the other party also accounts for China’s narration, even though they don’t favor it.
This ability to be accounted also can be described by China’s ability to perform a control over the discourse or narration inside the council, by proposing another narration as an
alternative to be discussed. By proposing another narration, it is also shows the narration bias against other condition. It is shown in the fact that if there only the notion of the Bahrain’s in the council’s consideration of the war, the discussion will not account the United States attack. It is in fact that the 3rd March has made Bahrain’s narration as the status quo and legitimate it and pacify the alternate narrative, but China’s counter-narrative strategy is a way to keep the bias displayed to the public.
A counter-narrative, seldom as it seems, but becomes a weight to the narration that had been put in the public discourse. As Saldanha, et al. (2021) had explained in their article, alternative narration emerged with a tool and material to deconstruct the main narration, that is Bahrain’s narration; and the tool and material is made easy by China’s proposed narrative.
We have identified both of the actions that China uses that indicate its power inside the UNSC. Our explanation of both of the action and its significance also clarified the power that China has in a multilateral approach compared to using the unilateral approach. The multilateral approach gives China more power from the other actors, signified by its power to veto the decision of the state’s coalition. China cannot do this outside the organization mechanism. There is no way China can disturb a state’s decision unilaterally unless it comes to waging a war that costs more.
China also more power to control the narration inside the legitimate council, that is the UNSC, rather than outside of it. Even though Bahrain’s notion had been legitimized as the main consideration of the council and pacify other alternate narration, China narration about the attack by the United States still lives in the council, and it takes account within the council’s forum. Outside the council’s forum, there is no way it can be accounted as a narration unless there is effort to make the narration alive until being brought to the council’s consideration, but that takes more time for China, aside from what the efforts can be done.
Conclusion
Discussing China’s action inside the multilateral mechanism of UNSC makes me remember the notion of Robert Keohane in his After Hegemon about the reason why states come up with cooperation, that is because it makes it more rational for it to take the lost cost compared to the unilateral approach. China shows us this by the action of controlling the decision and controlling the narration, both things that can be done unilaterally but with more cost. We had discussed many things here, but one thing that I take for granted for my discussion is China’s action for Iran. Why actually China does that and is it for Iran is not in my sight here. The answer is a complementary to my current discussion and it will show the dynamics within the international affair.
Referensi
Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China (FMPRC). (March 2026). Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning’s Regular Press Conference on March 3, 2026. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/lxjzh/202603/t20260303_11867987.html
Kasmi, J. (2025). Multilateral Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution: Evaluating International Mediation in the Kosovo-Serbia Dispute. The Journal of Cross-Regional Dialogues/La Revue de dialogues inter-regionaux.
Lukes, S. (2021). Power: A Radical View [3rd Edition]. Red Globe Press.
Saldanha, F. P., Pozzebon, M., Mailhot, C., & Puil D. L. (2022). Counter-Narratives Mobilized by Deprived Communities Through Theatre Interventions: Deconstructing and Reframing Master Narratives. Management Communication Quarterly, Vol. 37(3), p. 478–507.
Security Council Report (SCR). (28 February 2026a). Emergency Meeting on the Military Escalation in the Middle East.
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2026/02/emergency-meeting-on-the-mil itary-escalation-in-the-middle-east.php
Security Council Report (SCR). (28 March 2026). The Middle East Crisis Votes on Two Draft Resolution.
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2026/03/the-middle-east-crisis-votes-on -two-draft-resolutions.php
Security Council Report (SCR). (28 March 2026c). Middle East Crisis Vote on a Draft Resolution on the Strait of Hormuz.
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2026/04/middle-east-crisis-vote-on-a-dr aft-resolution-on-the-strait-of-hormuz.php
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